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Abstract 
Many observers have suggested that the strengthening of executives vis-à-vis other political actors, in particular na-
tional parliaments, has been one of the principal effects of European integration (and perhaps international coopera-
tion more generally) on national democracies, with democracy being “perverted” and parliaments becoming “rubber 
stamps.” Moravcsik (1994) has argued that there were four theoretical ways in which international cooperation 
could “strengthen the state,” by redistributing institutional power, initiative (agenda-setting), information and ideas 
in favor of the executive in Europe. However, consideration of domestic politics in Europe shows that elites are 
already – for exogenous reasons – dominant in institutions, initiative and information. In Europe, therefore, the 
“strong” executive is not a product of European integration, and the reverse may even be true: that the dominance of 
the executive in national political systems has been a prerequisite for the success of European integration – that 
European openness has been built on national political closure. More generally, assessments of the impact of 
international cooperation on democracy should measure the effect of international cooperation at the margin on the 
existing characteristics of particular national democratic systems. 
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Introduction 
The “two-level games” approach to international relations argues that international poli-
tics is undertaken by national executives who simultaneously strategize at the national and inter-
national levels (Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson and Putnam 1993; Moravcsik 1993a). In order to 
achieve gains from international cooperation, diplomatic negotiators need to be able to both bar-
gain with their foreign counterparts and ratify (and implement) their international agreements. 
Their ability to do the latter depends on the preferences of domestic constituents and the proce-
dures of domestic institutions, particularly legislatures. The interaction of domestic and interna-
tional politics becomes a “two-level game,” because national leaders are able to use their inter-
national deal making not only to achieve international cooperation but to change their domestic 
political outcomes – to achieve domestic goals which would otherwise be blocked.
1 
National executives have a “win-set” of achievable policy ambitions at the national level, 
which depends on the preferences of other groups in domestic society and the institutions which 
empower them. By putting together complex package deals, adding international side-payments 
to satisfy domestic groups, or presenting domestic interests with “take-it-or-leave-it” decisions 
on bargains which are costly to renegotiate, executives have the opportunity to increase their 
autonomy from domestic groups by engaging in international cooperation. This process of en-
larging executive win-sets is known in the literature as “cutting slack.” The larger the executive 
                                                 
1In Putnam’s classic example, the 1978 Bonn summit conference, Germany and Japan agreed to boost economic 
growth while the United States agreed to reform its energy policy. Not only did these key governments adopt poli-
cies different from those which they would have pursued in the absence of international cooperation, but national 
executives manipulated the international processes to realize their domestic goals. In this way, for example, the 
German Chancellor Schmidt and the Social Democratic Party were able to maneuver their coalition allies (the Free 
Democratic Party) and the Bundesbank, both strongly opposed to reflation, into supporting a policy which would 
have been costly or impossible to enact without the Bonn Summit’s package deal. See Putnam 1988, pp. 428-429. 3 
win-set, then, ceteris paribus, the greater the opportunities for international agreements. How-
ever, the distributional outcome of negotiations may depend on the room for maneuver of the 
bargainers: a government with a smaller win-set may, of necessity, give fewer concessions than a 
government which can make a wider range of agreements. The tension between incentives to en-
large win-sets (“cut slack”) and incentives to reduce them (“tie one’s hands”) is at the heart of 
two-level games international relations theory.  
This question of the interaction between international cooperation and domestic politics 
is pressingly relevant to the effect of European integration on domestic politics and democratic 
accountability in EU Member States. Many authors consider democratic politics in Europe to be 
under considerable strain from the effects of increasing integration.
2 In this regard, it is common 
not only to draw attention to possible accountability deficiencies among the European institu-
tions, but also to argue that the process of European integration has had significant effects on 
politics inside the Member States of the European Union, by upsetting the balance between ex-
ecutives and legislators. 
In this paper, I advance an argument which challenges the existing understanding of the 
effects of European integration on domestic politics (and vice versa). International cooperation 
has the capacity to strengthen national executives in particular ways, but is unlikely to be impor-
tant in the case where executives are already dominant in those resources, as is often the case in 
contemporary Europe. 
This paper is organized as follows. The first section sets out current empirical and theo-
retical work on the effects of European integration on domestic politics, taking the influential 
                                                 
2See Scharpf 1999; Schmitter 2000; Siedentop 2000 4 
model of Moravcsik (1994
3) as its starting point. The second section contrasts “European” 
policy-making with domestic policy-making in these countries along the criteria of agenda-
setting, executive prerogatives and information.
4 The third section draws tentative conclusions 
about the connection between European integration, democracy and executive power in 
European politics and elsewhere.  
                                                 
3“Why the European Community strengthens the state: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation” Center for 
European Studies Working Paper No. 52, Cambridge: Harvard University. Copies of this paper are available from 
the Center for European Studies, Harvard University or via http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~moravcs/ 
publications.html#. The argument is outlined at less length in Moravcsik 1993b, pp. 514-517. 
4“European” policy-making refers to the effecting in national political systems of norms agreed as a result of parti-
cipation in European Community/ European Union institutions. An example could be implementation in France of a 
European Directive on the issuing of securities. Domestic policy-making refers to policies which do not aim to ful-
fill a European Union (or other international) norm.  5 
International Cooperation and Domestic Politics in Europe 
There is a consensus on the effect of European integration on at least one aspect of na-
tional politics:
5 that it has strengthened executive
6 power, because it is the executive which has 
direct access to European policy-making and policy-makers in the Council, in the European in-
stitutions and other Member States; and that national parliaments, in particular, have not suc-
ceeded in scrutinizing or controlling actions by their national governments.
7 John Biffen, former 
Leader of the House of Commons, for example, has argued that “in our relationship with the EC, 
the government has retained its sphere of authority… more effectively than has Parliament.”
8 In 
France, legislators are apparently worried that the French Parliament is becoming little more than 
“a poorly informed rubber stamp.”
9 An empirical survey of the relationships between national 
parliaments and the European Union concludes that “National parliaments have been left behind 
in the rush.”
10   
This assessment of the declining role of legislators as a result of European integration is 
not limited to participants and empirical observers. Many commentators assessing the democratic 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the European institutions agree that executives have been 
strengthened against other national institutions, even if they disagree on many other aspects of 
European integration, and its effects on democracy in Europe. Fritz Scharpf writes that “In areas 
                                                 
5This is not to say that there is agreement on all aspects of European integration’s influence on national politics or 
democracy more generally. Indeed major questions remain the subject of heated dispute, including the role of sub-
national regions (‘multi-level governance’), the creation of a European consciousness or public (a European 
‘Demos’), the influence of interest groups, the accountability of the European Commission, Parliament and Court of 
Justice, et cetera; not to mention the question of normative assessment of any empirical findings. However, the con-
tention that executives have been strengthened against legislatures is perhaps one of the areas of least disagreement. 
For a counter argument to Moravcsik 1994, see Fioremos 1997 – which however concentrates on declining inde-
pendence of national governments because of economic interdependence/ capital mobility. However, almost all 
commentators on the EU agree on the importance of increased economic interdependence, and this is a separate 
question from the reallocation of political resources within domestic politics.  
6The executive branch here refers to the prime minister or head of government, or more broadly the cabinet. 
7See Martin 2000, p. 150.  
8Cited in Moravcsik 1994, p. 16. 
9See Norton 1995, p. 48. 
10See Norton 1995, p. 192. 6 
where governments are in agreement, they may thus be able to override domestic opposition 
through joint action at the European level.”
11 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks write that “one 
contribution of liberal institutionalism … lies in the attempt to specify conditions under which 
‘international cooperation tends on balance to strengthen the domestic power of executives vis-à-
vis opposition groups.’”
12 J.H.H. Weiler writes, “Community and Union governance pervert the 
balance between executive and legislative organs of governance of the State.”
13 Indeed, it has 
been argued that strengthening the executive is one of the wider effects of international coopera-
tion in general, and should therefore be considered a problem for democracy. Klaus Dieter Wolf 
writes “de-democratization will take place as long as intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms 
offer national governments the opportunity to reassert state autonomy vis-à-vis increasingly as-
sertive domestic and transnational societal pressures.”
14  
Andrew Moravcsik’s paper “Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Do-
mestic Politics and International Cooperation”
15 (Moravcsik 1994) advanced this discussion by 
putting forward a set of theoretical bases to clarify the potential effect on domestic politics of in-
ternational cooperation. Building on observations about the strengthening of executives (and 
weakening of legislatures) in the European Community, and on the theoretical literature on two-
level games in international relations, Moravcsik set out to show how national executives could 
                                                 
11See Scharpf 1999, p. 25 (with a caveat about the ability of national elites to deflect electoral unpopularity onto 
European institutions). 
12Hooghe and Marks 2001, p. 31, note 2, quoting Moravcsik 1994. 
13Weiler 1999, p. 266. 
14Wolf 1999, p. 333 (cited from the abstract).  
15The title of this paper expresses its profound debt to Moravcsik’s 1994 paper. It might be argued in criticism that 
the term “state” has a broader meaning than merely the executive branch of government, but Moravcsik’s usage is 
clear, and for this reason, and the sake of consistency, is replicated here.  7 
use international negotiations to enlarge their win-sets in domestic politics, and to apply this to 
the case of European integration.
16  
Four different specific causal mechanisms (two procedural, two cognitive) enable execu-
tives to increase their autonomy - “cut slack”: 
“By transforming issues traditionally defined as ‘domestic policy’ into ‘foreign policy,’ 
international engagement can open and close channels for domestic actors to influence the initia-
tion of policy (initiative); alter the domestic constitutional and statutory procedures under which 
policy decisions are ratified and implemented (institutions); create or redress asymmetries in 
knowledge (information); and reshape the possibilities for domestic actors to justify policies 
(ideas).”
17 
After outlining his theoretical approach, Moravcsik’s methodology is to demonstrate by 
illustrative examples the relevance of these causal mechanisms to European integration and de-
mocratic politics. All the following examples are cited from Moravcsik 1994.
18 
Initiative (Agenda-setting): International negotiations may strengthen the agenda-
setting power of national executives, because the outcomes of international agreements – such as 
European legislation or institutional agreements – can be presented to parliaments to as an un-
                                                 
16Moravcsik’s paper does touch on other aspects of European integration and national politics, democracy etc, in-
cluding the role of regions (“multi-level governance”) and referenda. These issues are separable (at least in large 
part) from the question of the strengthening or weakening of national executives vis-à-vis other national political 
actors (such as legislators), which is what the vast majority of Moravcsik’s paper (and especially the empirical con-
tents) concentrate on. This paper similarly concentrates on this issue. 
17Moravcsik 1994, p. 7. 
18Moravcsik puts aspects of agenda-setting into both “institutional” and “initiative” categories. See for example 
Moravcsik 1994, pp. 9 and 11. This has the advantage of highlighting that certain aspects of agenda-setting advan-
tages come from international cooperation per se, while others come from special procedures adopted to implement 
these procedures domestically. However, this has the cost of somewhat confusing the categories. For the sake of 
clarity, this paper refers to agenda-setting capabilities under the category “initiative” and all other procedural capa-
bilities of the executive (such as decree-powers, the ability to forego parliamentary procedures completely, constitu-
tional prerogatives etc) into the category of “institutions.”  8 
amendable “take it or leave it decision.” This is the equivalent to a legislative deliberation under 
a “closed rule.”
19  
Institutions: International negotiations may strengthen the executive because of constitu-
tional or other provisions which enhance executive autonomy. As Moravcsik writes, “Relative to 
procedures commonly used in matters of domestic policy, foreign policy procedures often re-
strict opportunities for meaningful deliberation.”
20 The German Chancellor, for example, may 
use his “Richtlinienkompetenz” (the “guidelines competence” enshrined in the Grundgesetz 
[German “Basic Law” or Constitution], Article 65) to enjoy a privileged position in foreign af-
fairs.
21 Even where domestic ratification is required, the opportunities for parliaments and pub-
lics to amend, alter or reject either European treaties or (perhaps even more so) day-to-day Euro-
pean legislation are very limited. In France, only 8 percent of European Directives are imple-
mented with the involvement of the National Assembly.
22 Further, where a European Directive 
has been agreed by the Council (and other European institutions), opposition can be not only dif-
ficult but illegal.
23 European law thus acts to reinforce executive initiatives for policy change.  
Information: International negotiations can create domestic informational asymmetries 
in favor of the executive. Executives may, through their direct participation in international 
negotiations and institutions, possess technical and political information which is not available to 
domestic societal groups which seek to influence or control their actions. In the EC, for example, 
“Debates and votes in the meetings of the Commission, the Council of Ministers, COREPER and 
the European Council – as in many other international negotiations – take place almost entirely 
                                                 
19Moravcsik 1994, p. 9. 
20Moravcsik 1994, p. 11. 
21Moravcsik 1994, p. 16. The Richtlinienkompetenz – or the Chancellor’s constitutional power to give policy guide-
lines – is not limited to foreign affairs.  
22Moravcsik 1994, p. 21. 
23Moravcsik 1994, p. 21. 9 
off the public record.”
24 Without information, societal groups face formidable cognitive barriers 
to influencing European policy. 
Ideas: International negotiations can also bolster the domestic power of political execu-
tives by providing them with additional sources of ideological legitimation associated with inter-
national cooperation. The “European idea” is, on the one hand, formidably connected to ideas of 
peace, prosperity and cosmopolitanism and, on the other, is notably vague and open-ended; it 
thus provides a particularly flexible instrument through which executives can legitimate their 
policies ideologically.
25 
Note that none of these four causal mechanisms relies on the content of international co-
operation providing the national executive with any tangible resources to “buy” support from 
domestic groups. If international cooperation provides tangible advantages which can be shared 
with other domestic groups, it will be easier for the executive to ratify its international agree-
ments. But at its simplest and starkest, the argument is that the national executive is strengthened 
whether or not there exist gains from international cooperation (and whether or not these are 
shared with other national elites or organized interests). As Moravcsik writes: 
“In extreme cases, executives may welcome multilateral restrictions on national sover-
eignty in place of unilateral action, even in the absence of a direct international quid pro quo, as 
long as it increases their autonomy at home – a paradoxical prediction for conventional theories 
of international relations.”
26 
                                                 
24Moravcsik 1994, p. 23.  
25Moravcsik 1994, p. 24. 
26Moravcsik 1994, p. 2. 10 
Even if pursuing an identical policy to previous domestic ambitions, international coop-
eration can – through these causal mechanisms – strengthen the executive domestically, in pur-
suit of their goals.
27 
Moravcsik’s achievement is to provide a set of theoretical bases for the effect of interna-
tional cooperation on domestic politics, and to furnish extensive examples for his application in 
the important test case of the European Community.
28 Based on these findings, Moravcsik 
reaches conclusions about the effects of European integration, most importantly arguing that the 
resulting increased autonomy for national executives has made an important contribution to the 
successes of integration. Enlarging executive win-sets has allowed the pursuit policies which 
create diffuse public benefits for the many but considerable costs for powerful interest groups – 
just like “fast track” arrangements for domestic ratification of trade liberalization. Any such “de-
mocratic deficit” might therefore only be solved at the risk of reducing public benefits.
29 Morav-
csik’s argument about the interaction of international and domestic politics is illustrated in 
Figure One [see end]. Domestic executives whose domestic policy initiatives would be blocked 
by other national actors are able to succeed because of the additional executive resources pro-
vided by European integration.  
                                                 
27From a methodological perspective, keeping the policy unchanged makes it possible to isolate the effects of the 
four causal mechanisms from the possible effect of changes in policy content. In reverse, looking at the validity of 
the causal mechanisms by which nation executives may be strengthened will show whether unchanged policies (i.e. 
policies which would normally fail nationally) could in fact be implemented, or whether additional benefits from 
international cooperation are necessary for successful implementation. 
28Moravcsik 1994 also provides at full length four examples of European Community policy-making “strengthening 
the state”: structural adjustment in the European Coal and Steel Community; France and the Creation of the Com-
mon Market; the consequences of the Common Commercial Policy; and the founding and functioning of the Euro-
pean Monetary System. For reasons of space, these are not considered at length in this paper. 
29See Moravcsik 1994, p. 56. “The democratic deficit is not a problem; it is a dilemma.” For the connection between 
strengthening the state and broader theorizing about European integration, see Moravcsik 1998, p. 76. 11 
European integration  and domestic politics in European states. 
Moravcsik’s approach is persuasive. Above all, it clarifies specific causal mechanisms by 
which international cooperation might have an impact on the distribution of power at the domes-
tic level. The schema (institutions, initiative, information, ideas) is arguably comprehensive. It 
has the distinct virtue of theoretical broadness and applicability to international cooperation in 
general, not merely to European integration and domestic politics in Europe. Its approach de-
serves application to a wide variety of international institutions and different national political 
regimes. 
The question for this paper is, however, what does this general schema explain about 
politics in Europe – the effects of European integration on European politics and democracy, and 
vice versa? In answering, we must compare executive influence in European policy-making to 
executive influence in other aspects of domestic policy. This task is admittedly difficult, and this 
paper is just the beginning of much-needed research on this issue. But, with that caveat, there are 
good reasons to believe that the effects which Moravcsik convincingly argues might flow from 
international cooperation have had little concrete impact in the case of the European Union and 
domestic politics in Europe. Why is this? 
The broad justification for this contention is that in today’s European domestic politics, 
national executives often have a very dominant position in the areas of agenda-setting and infor-
mation; and that where institutions do provide opportunities for other societal groups to influence 
domestic policy-making, it is very rare that they do not also provide similar opportunities to in-
fluence European policy-making. Indeed the hypothesized effects of three of the four causal 
mechanisms (institutions, initiative and information) for the influence of international coopera-
tion are strikingly consistent with wider observations on the state of European domestic politics. 12 
In large part this is because in parliamentary regimes, with disciplined parties (Laver and Shepsle 
1994), legislative control of the executive is very limited.
30 Other veto points, such strong second 
chambers or central banks, do, contrary to expectations, maintain their role in European policy-
making.  
These three causal mechanisms of influence are re-examined from this perspective below. 
Two prior notes should be made. I restrict my analysis to the political organizational factors of 
initiative, institutions and information, and omit a full analysis of the effect of the European idea. 
This is motivated by the methodological concern that it is necessary to control for more easily 
observable factors such as institutions in order to isolate the independent effects of ideas. As 
King, Keohane and Verba write “In particular, the observed dependent variable (policies) and 
explanatory variable (ideas held by individuals) must be prepared with a precisely defined coun-
terfactual situation in which the explanatory variable takes on a different value: the relevant indi-
viduals had different ideas” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 191). An assessment of the impact 
of the EU on national executive initiative, information and institutions should therefore proceed 
prior to consideration of the impact of ideas.
31 Second, the methodology adopted here is to take 
Moravcsik’s own examples of how the EU “strengthens the state,” and re-examine them by ref-
erence to the broader literature on initiative, institutions and information in domestic politics in 
European politics. This paper – although it intends to be as comprehensive as such a paper of 
such length allows – does not set out a full empirical investigation of the impact of the EU on na-
tional executive resources. Rather its selective and illustrative approach is a replica of Morav-
                                                 
30See Laver and Shepsle 1999, pp. 12-13. “The conventional coalition theorists’ view of governance by legislature 
flies in the face of the undoubtedly firm control of legislatures by the government of the day, a generalization recent-
ly reviewed and supported in a series of country studies (Laver and Shepsle, 1994). As we shall see, conceiving of 
the structure of policy making and implementation in a more realistic manner provides an altogether richer and more 
suggestive account of government formation. A legislature makes and breaks governments, to be sure, but it does 
not, in our view, run the country.” Emphasis in original. 
31Note that if the conclusions of this paper are accepted, national executives may not be in need of a great deal of 
strengthening from the “European idea.” 13 
csik’s own methodology and evidence. By re-considering the best evidence given for reinforce-
ment of the executive, rather than selecting other aspects of domestic politics which might sug-
gest different conclusions, it biases its investigation against the rejection of Moravcsik’s conclu-
sion, and confronts the “strengthen the state” argument directly on its strongest ground.
32 
                                                 
32In the same way that a quantitative research finding might be disputed by re-analysis of the original data set. 14 
Initiative, institutions, information reconsidered:   
Initiative (Agenda-setting): Does European integration strengthen the initiative powers 
of national executives? The answer to this question depends on where the agenda-setting right 
lies in more routine European domestic politics. If agenda-setting is usually firmly in the hands 
of the executive, then the European Union can have little effect. If agenda-setting is more dis-
puted or dispersed, then international cooperation, if it provides the executive with uncommon 
opportunities to make take-it-or-leave-it proposals, can have a significant effect.  
The evidence is, overwhelmingly, the national executives in contemporary Europe are 
firmly in control of the agenda-setting process in national parliaments; and that this finding holds 
substantially true across a wide variety of parliamentary systems. Recent work on parliamentary 
regimes has emphasized the agenda-setting dominance of national governments.
33 In France, the 
government has the right to control the parliamentary agenda under Article 48 of the Constitu-
tion.
34 In Ireland, one commentator writes, the executive “has virtually total control over the leg-
islative timetable.”
35 Strikingly, while Moravcsik claims that international cooperation offers 
particular opportunities for offering legislatures proposals “under a closed rule,”
36 a recent theo-
retical work on contemporary parliamentary government concludes “that governmental statutory 
power in parliamentary democracies is comparable to that of committees in the U.S. Congress 
armed with restrictive procedural rules”
37 – and not just in foreign affairs.  
                                                 
33Laver and Shepsle, p. 278ff. See also p. 41: “One of the main ways in which the cabinet dominates the legislature 
in the business of making public policy has to do with the flow of legislative business. Typically in parliamentary 
democracies, the cabinet has a tight grip on the parliamentary timetable.” 
34Thiébault 1994, p. 140. 
35Farrell  1994, p. 74. 
36See Moravcsik 1994, p. 9. 
37See Laver and Shepsle, p. 279. The attribution of agenda-setting power to executives in parliamentary systems is 
not merely a matter of observation but – at least to some degree – a matter intrinsic to the nature of parliamentary 
systems per se, where parliaments consider package alternatives set forth by executives. As Tsebelis writes: “In par-
liamentary systems the executive (government) controls the agenda, and the legislature (parliament) accepts or re-
jects proposals, while in presidential systems the legislature makes the proposals and the executive (president) signs 15 
  Contemporary parliaments in Europe routinely give overwhelming agenda-setting rights 
to national executives. There is little for European integration to add. 
Institutions: Do European democracies provide European executives with distinct for-
eign policy-making powers which provide more autonomy – or “agency slack” – to national ex-
ecutives than normal domestic policy-making? The evidence here is generally negative. Even in 
parliamentary regimes, where executives have particular constitutional powers, such as the Ger-
man Chancellor’s Richtlinienkompetenz (the “Guidelines competence,” Article 65 of the Grund-
gesetz), observers cannot agree that what impact – if any – such procedures have on policy- 
making, placing much more emphasis on coalition requirements and other political constraints. 
One commentator on the Chancellor and the constitution writes:  “The chancellor’s constitutional 
capacity to determine policy parameters in this way is considerably restricted by the political re-
quirements of the parliamentary system and coalition government” and “When considering the 
effect of the constitution on chancellors since 1949, the outstanding feature is the great elasticity 
of Article 65.”
38 
                                                                                                                                                             
or vetoes them. … The property is more general: the veto player who has the power to propose will have a signifi-
cant advantage in policy-making. This analysis indicates that with respect to legislation, parliaments will be more 
significant in presidential than parliamentary systems, and presidents will be less significant than governments.” See 
Tsebelis 1995, p. 325. Italics in the original. National executive influence on non-legislative institutions, such as 
central banks or second chambers, is considered in the following section. 
38See Southern, pp. 32 and 41. See also Padgett, pp. 4-5: “The complexity of government defies a precise codifica-
tion of inner-executive relations according to these principles, and constitutional provisions do little more than 
sketch a broad outline. Ultimately it is the political environment which is decisive in establishing the parameters of 
executive authority. Thus countries with similar constitutional provisions display sharp variations in the exercise of 
executive authority. The Italian and German constitutions are strikingly similar in this respect [executive authority], 
but the German Chancellor can exercise immeasurably more power over government that his Italian counterpart 
can.” See also Moravcsik (1998), p. 102: “Adenauer repeatedly attempted to extract greater concessions [from his 
domestic coalition partners]. In January 1956 he went so far as to invoke the Chancellor’s constitutional foreign pol-
icy powers (Richtlinienkompetenz), requesting that agriculture and industry bear ‘sacrifices’ in order to achieve geo-
political goals,  including closer relations with France and European institutions with real autonomy, particularly in 
the field of nuclear energy. But this move failed to shift the compromise.” As these examples show, the fact that 
governments have agenda-setting and other advantages vis-à-vis parliaments does not mean that there are no con-
straints on government behavior. The main constraint is the necessity to maintain a parliamentary majority, which 
often means the necessity of negotiating with coalition partners. See Laver and Schepsle 1996, p. 41: “In effect, the 
only way for the legislature to effect a substantial change in government policy is to change the government, or at 
least mount a credible threat to do so.” 16 
This may be because the making of policy in parliamentary regimes, in an environment 
of disciplined political parties which is the norm for contemporary European politics, the main 
constraint on executive behavior is the requirement to retain a majority in (the dominant house 
of) parliament. Institutional constraints are derivative of this: where a parliamentary majority is 
willing to support the executive, other constraints do not hold; where a majority is unwilling to 
support an executive, executive foreign policy powers (constitutional or otherwise) cannot be 
successfully invoked. Put another way, focusing on constitutional attribution of powers may be 
appropriate for separation of powers regimes (although there may be room for doubt even there), 
but for parliamentary regimes it is inappropriately formalist. Enumeration of constitutional pow-
ers matters little compared to political constraints, even in foreign policy.
39 
France’s semi-presidential regime may appear different in this regard. Not only does the 
separate election of the president increase the likelihood of separate preferences between legisla-
ture and executive, but there are also considerable executive prerogatives.
40 As noted above, less 
than 8 percent of European Directives are implemented in France with the involvement of the 
National Assembly. But this is not due to the foreign policy powers of the President. Rather 
French constitutional scholars confirm that it reflects the fact that the French government has 
considerable decree-making power (under the division of competences in Articles 34 and 37 of 
the constitution
41), which can be used for European Directives just as they can for domestic regu-
lations.
42 There is no “extra” power for Directives. If the French Republic wanted of its own ac-
                                                 
39This is not to say that constitutional arrangements can make no difference whatever. “Rules of the game” type 
powers, like the power to fire ministers or call elections, will have an effect on all aspects of politics, not European 
politics alone. 
40See Huber 1996, pp. 24-37 for an assessment of the executive powers in the French constitution. 
41For the articles of the French constitution, see Finer, Bogdanor and Rudden 1995. 
42Levesque, p. 52. As a scholar of French European policy and administration writes: “Toute directive publiée au 
Journal official des Communautés européenes amène ainsi le département concerné à étudier le choix de la norme 
de transposition. Selon que le text concerne un domaine que relève de l’article 34 ou de l’article 37 de la Constitu-
tion, les services compétents proposent un projet de loi ou de décret.” 17 
cord to change its economic regulations in the same way in which European Directives required 
it to, it would use the same procedures. The French executive is autonomous from parliamentary 
influence in the implementation of European Directives not because these are “foreign policy 
issues” but because the French executive is autonomous in such policy areas whether imple-
menting European or domestic initiatives.  
There is a broader point here, which is that the issue areas which make up the bulk of EU 
decision-making (economic regulation) may be even more associated with executive institutional 
and initiative advantages in domestic politics than, for example, taxation or health care (this is 
likely true in other Member States too). In the case of France, Article 37 of the constitution gives 
the executive the power to make rules (without parliamentary involvement) in the domain of 
“régulation,” which is to say all matters which fall outside the domain of law, as stated in article 
34. Without asserting a complete identity of terminology or scope, the fact that French executive 
decree-making power is associated with the constitutional concept of “régulation” and the Euro-
pean integration is an essentially regulatory construction (Majone 1996) may well explain much 
of executive autonomy on European policy-making in France. 
What about other institutional barriers on executive dominance, such as powerful second 
legislative chambers, regional governments, central banks and constitutional courts? Here too, 
there is evidence is that institutions, where powerful domestically, tend to maintain their influ-
ence on European policy. Institutional veto points, even where not required for the taking of the 
“European” decision in the Council of Ministers (or European Council, more generally “Brus-
sels”), continue to have a very significant role thereafter, even in defiance of European “legal” 
sanctions.  18 
One case may be illustrative of this point (this is an under-researched area). In the case of 
the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive, implementation was much prompter in Britain 
(which had to fundamentally change its waste processing regime, at considerable cost and devia-
tion from national policy norms) than in Germany (whose previous regime was only slightly al-
tered) because of the need for the assent of the Bundesrat to alterations in existing German pol-
icy. The mere fact of eventual penalties for non-compliance with European law was not suffi-
cient to secure the agreement of the Bundesrat. Rather than being strengthened, “the federal gov-
ernment was trapped between the Commission on the one hand and the Bundesrat on the 
other.”
43 Agreement was only reached through concessions on a related issue – a significant side-
payment, in effect – by the federal government  (Haverland 2000). The evidence of this case sug-
gests that where national systems provide for other veto-players with which the national ex-
ecutive would usually have to negotiate, they are unable to escape this obligation merely by 
making “European” policy. 
Germany also provides an example of failure by the federal government to use European 
policy to effectively strengthen its hand against the Bundesbank. In the late 1970s, Chancellor 
Schmidt tried to use the creation of the European Monetary System to force the Bundesbank into 
loosening monetary policy. But while the Bundesbank was incapable of preventing the creation 
of the EMS, which was conceived in which secret negotiations by heads of government, the 
Bundesbank was capable of ensuring that the EMS would not result in a loosening of its anti-
inflationary mandate – which was Schmidt’s real objective.
44 European initiatives on subject 
                                                 
43See Haverland 2000, p. 99.  
44I am grateful to Mark Copelovitch for advice on this point. While this example shows that national executives do 
on occasion indeed try to go around national constraints through international cooperation, it also shows that such 
domestic constraints frequently persist despite these efforts. See Moravcsik 1994, pp. 39-45. By contrast, see Mor-
avcsik, n.d., for a subsequent view that European policy had a “relatively modest” impact on domestic political 
resources.  19 
matters where non-executive national elites would normally have veto roles tend to be still-born, 
incomplete or even counter-productive (exposing the executive to the potential of sanctions at 
the Court of Justice,
45 without being able to change policy).  
To be fair and complete, there are a number of examples of tangible executive preroga-
tives for European policy-making. In the UK for example, the European Communities Act 1972 
allows the government to amend primary legislation by statutory instrument (albeit through a 
parliamentary process) to implement European obligations.
46 In France, the government has the 
ability to implement European Regulations (not Directives) without a legislative process even 
where they would normally fall outside the scope of the French executive’s constitutional 
decree-making powers.
47 The significance of such institutional prerogatives (and any others) de-
serves further examination, but it is not clear that they add up to a general conclusion of a sig-
nificantly reinforced executive, given a base-line of general executive dominance in the regula-
tory issue-areas most relevant to European integration. The use of statutory instruments has been 
rising in the United Kingdom over the twentieth century, quite exogenously from European inte-
gration (Page 2001). In the French case, further research is needed to assess whether an impor-
tant quantum of European Regulations fall outside the French executive’s decree power in mat-
ters of “régulation.” 
Information: Does the European Union provide greater opportunities for national execu-
tives to “cut slack” because their behavior is less observable by other societal groups? Is interna-
                                                 
45Haverland 2000, p. 99. 
46Primary legislation is legislation passed by Parliament. Secondary legislation is orders made by government minis-
ters, usually with the possibility of parliamentary review and rejection within a specified period of time. Usually sec-
ondary legislation cannot override primary legislation. However the European Communities Act 1971 allows just 
such secondary legislation to amend primary legislation, if it is needed to fulfill a European Community obligation. 
47See Lequesne pp. 230-233. European regulations may be implemented by decree whether or not such action would 
normally be within the French government’s decree-making power. Lequesne notes however that European regula-
tions rarely need national implementing measures and that the French government sometimes adopts such measures 
by law (i.e. through the French parliament) anyway. 20 
tional policy-making more opaque than domestic policy-making? This may seem intuitively 
plausible, but even here a comparison with domestic policy-making must be established. What is 
the level of informational dominance of national executives in the domestic political systems and 
how does this compare to executive actions on European policy? Three points are worth making, 
all of which significantly qualify any effect of international cooperation. 
First, observers of European politics argue that European executives already have consid-
erable information advantages vis-à-vis their national legislatures. On the question of legislative 
information, Laver and Shepsle, writing about contemporary parliamentarism in general, con-
clude that “By virtue of controlling the main departments of state, … the cabinet … has a near 
monopoly of both the information and the drafting skills needed to prepare legislation….”
48 
Second, it is not clear that European policy-making is intrinsically more opaque than do-
mestic policy-making. In fact it might be argued that the reverse is true. As Moravcsik himself 
notes elsewhere: “Constant scrutiny from 15 different governments, moreover, renders the EU 
more transparent and less corrupt than almost any national government in Europe. ‘Sunshine 
laws’ reveal documents, newspapers widely report deliberations, and the near total absence of 
discretionary spending or bureaucratic adjudication almost eliminates common incentives for 
corruption.”
49 Even negotiations on “grand bargains” may be more transparent that national 
political power-broking, given the relatively open agenda-setting for IGC and summit discussions.  
Third, it is worth remembering that organized groups are able to address many of the dif-
ficulties associated with monitoring European policy-making. The Länder in Germany have de-
veloped a wide range of information sources including the supply of “detached national experts” 
to the European institutions and the establishment of representative offices in Brussels (Baden-
                                                 
48See Laver and Shepsle 1996, p. 41. See also p. 38 ff. 
49Moravcsik 2001. 21 
Württemberg, 2001). Interest groups address their informational difficulties not least by employ-
ing former officials who have been deeply involved in European issues: the London Investment 
Bankers’ Association (LIBA), for example, therefore employs former officials of the Bank of 
England, with previous experience in the EU process.
50 Many of these difficulties are not quali-
tatively different to those which they need to regularly address to express their interests at the 
national level. Of course, interest groups and other institutions do not have complete information 
on European policy-making – but they certainly do not have complete information on national 
policy-making either.  
Two possible objections 
There are two connected objections which it is worth responding to at this point. First, it 
may be suggested that the argument that the European Union strengthens the state is “at the mar-
gin” and even if the executive is powerful at the domestic level, it is even more powerful when 
making European policy. Second, it might be argued that there is considerable variation in mat-
ters of executive dominance at the national level, and that a gross simplification is being prac-
ticed by suggesting that all European states have this executive dominance. 
It is undeniable that this paper necessarily generalizes and simplifies in an attempt to 
sketch a broad picture of the overall impact of European integration on domestic politics. So, of 
course, do arguments that Europe has indeed “strengthened the state” or “perverted democracy.” 
More detailed investigation research, sensitive to country and issue-area variation, is needed. 
However, to the above objections there are two responses.  
The first is that many of the examples given of executive reinforcement in particular na-
tional systems – such as the “guidelines” powers of the German Chancellor or the French execu-
tive’s non-parliamentary implementation of European Directives – have turned out on closer ex-
                                                 
50Personal knowledge.  22 
amination to be misleading or very exaggerated, even though these are presumably the strongest 
examples available to support the “strengthen the state” hypothesis.
51  
The second response is that, even allowing for some variation in national institutions, 
there are theoretical reasons why the above conclusions should hold broadly true across the 
European parliamentary democracies.
52 The advantage of specifying clear causal mechanisms for 
the effect of international cooperation on domestic politics is that these mechanisms can be com-
pared with domestic assessments of these resources. The tendency for international cooperation 
to strengthen the executive is therefore likely to be meaningful and important where the state 
executive has significantly different preferences from the legislature (more likely in separation of 
powers systems, less in parliamentary regimes
53), where distinct foreign policy powers are held 
by distinctly elected executives (rather than parliamentary executives), where international 
agreements have the capacity to bypass normal veto-players at the national level (but the exam-
ples considered above suggest that national veto-players – such as central banks or powerful sec-
                                                 
51Moravcsik 1994 contains other examples of European impact on domestic politics which would also benefit from 
comparison with base-line national politics. A claim that national bodies coordinating European policy are inacces-
sible to national elites and lobbyists (p. 19): but there is no consideration of similar coordination bodies on domestic 
policy. Similarly, a claim that Thatcher saw that protectionist sentiment in the House of Commons could be side-
lined by the Single European Act is approvingly cited (p. 19) – but it is not clear that Thatcher was much restrained 
by such sentiment in her economic liberalism in wider national policy-making, or whether the House of Commons is 
usually considered to have a significant impact on policy. 
52A similar objection – does variation in national practice invalidate conclusions which are held to be widely appli-
cable? – is answered by the authors of a recent book on parliamentary democracy as follows: “The relative advan-
tage of the cabinet [in agenda-setting] vis-à-vis parliament does of course vary from place to place and time to time. 
The nature of such variation depends mostly on the ability of parliament to bring independent judgment to bear upon 
the government’s proposals, as well as on the formal need for the government to acquire statutory authority from the 
parliament for its activities. This relationship, however, stacks the deck heavily in favor of the government. The gov-
ernment, after all, has a large and expert civil service at its disposal. Even in those cases in which parliament may 
muster some limited resources for detailed policy evaluation, the government’s control of procedural levers is suf-
ficient to neutralize these.”
52 Laver and Shepsle 1996 pp. 278-279. See also p. 280: “So long as it maintains the 
overall confidence of parliament, something it must take care to maintain at all times, the model assumes that the 
cabinet can maneuver in a more or less unfettered manner. A natural avenue for further work, of course, would relax 
this stricture, modeling agenda power in a more subtle and differentiated fashion. However this development might 
proceed, one thing is almost certain to remain clear. Whatever else it might be, parliamentary democracy is not rule 
by legislature.” 
53Some of the distinctive aspects of French semi-presidential arrangements have already been discussed earlier in 
this paper.  23 
ond chambers – tend to maintain their influence in Europe), where executives do not dominate 
agenda-setting (a dominance which is at least to some degree structurally inherent in parliamen-
tary regimes
54), and where the information advantages of the executive are not already large, or 
where policy-making at the international level is notably opaque (which is arguably not true of 
the European Union). 
This analysis suggests that the executive is not likely to be strengthened by the EU in the 
disciplined parliamentary democracies which are the norm in the contemporary Europe.
55 The 
impact of European integration on domestic politics from the three formal causal mechanisms of 
initiative, institutions and information is likely to be minimal. 
 
                                                 
54See Tsebelis 1996. Moravcsik 1994, page 64 refers to the “fast-track” procedure for trade agreements in the U.S. 
Congress. The importance of such a procedure in the U.S. is that it reverses the normal agenda-setting arrangements 
in presidential government. In parliamentary governments, however, executives frequently already enjoy agenda-
setting powers. 
55The obvious significant counterexample is Italy, whose parliamentary democracy has multiple agenda-setters and 
veto points (see, for example, Furlong in Norton 1990). But again, given the reality of these existing domestic ar-
rangements, it is not clear that domestic resources are significantly changed by European policy initiatives. See, for 
example, Dieter Kerwer’s “The modest impact of Europe on Italian Transport Policy” (Kerwer 2001).  24 
Conclusions: National Governments and European Integration 
European openness built on national closure? 
 
Many observers suggest that the European Union is suffering a democratic crisis. Some 
suggest that this is because the European institutions facilitate market “negative integration” 
more than regulative or redistributive “positive integration.”
56 Others argue that there is a mal-
aise of democratic participation which only wide-reaching institutional change can revitalize.
57 
One aspect (only) of this debate about European integration and democracy concerns the con-
nection between European integration and the distribution of national political resources. On this 
point, diverse commentators agree that national executives have been meaningfully strengthened 
at the national level against other domestic political actors, and that this centralization is part of 
the national “democratic deficit” which is a partner to the European “democratic deficit” at the 
European level.
58 This is the underlying logic to the conventional view that international cooper-
ation is a “problem for democracy” or that “national parliaments have been left behind in the 
rush.” If the same causal developments (that international cooperation has changed domestic po-
litical balances) are seen from another, more positive, perspective, there may be not a democratic 
deficit but a democratic dilemma, where national executives, empowered by the EU, are able to 
deliver benefits provided by policies that national political actors would otherwise block.. These 
views are illustrated in Figure One.
59   
                                                 
56Scharpf 1999. 
57Schmitter 2000. 
58For a contrary assertion (which may not refer to the balance of political resources within Member States), see 
Schmitter 2000, p. 127 
59Given the extensive critique here of Moravcsik’s 1994 paper, it is only fair and reasonable to note that Moravcsik’s 
own views on the role of executives in European integration have changed over time. As mentioned above (see foot-
note 44), see Moravcsik, n.d., for a subsequent view that the impact of European monetary agreements “has had a 
relatively modest impact on the balance of political resources in domestic politics” (p. 33). More recently, in assess-
ing (and largely rejecting) the possibility of a European “democratic deficit,” Moravcsik argues both that the EU in-
stitutions are part of a “broader trend towards … strong executive leadership” at the national level, and that there are 
considerable normative arguments for such developments, including the need to defend diffuse interests of the 25 
This paper suggests otherwise. It suggests that international cooperation in the European 
context has hardly changed existing executive resources. The limited involvement of national 
parliaments in particular is not the result of any particular crisis induced by the process of Euro-
pean integration but rather the result of broader changes in domestic political organization in 
twentieth-century Europe, and – if it is a crisis at all – it is a crisis whose causes are far removed 
from European integration.
60 The argument that European integration has been very important in 
enlarging executive win-sets – that the EU has “strengthened the state” in this sense – in contem-
porary Europe should be rejected. Where national executives want to change policy, but face 
tangible obstacles at the national level, the European Union does not automatically dissolve 
them.  
This analysis cannot but call attention to the fact that the prerequisites for international 
cooperation in terms of the necessary executive autonomy – dominance in information, agenda-
setting and institutions – have been conspicuously present in contemporary Europe, because of 
exogenous national political developments, perhaps most importantly changes in political party 
organisation. This opens up a new possibility for explanations of European integration, which is 
that executive autonomy has been an essential prior ingredient in the formulation of the Euro-
pean Union, rather than a result of it, and that today’s disciplined party systems, executive or-
ders,
61 and dominated legislatures are an essential precondition for international cooperation in 
Europe. This alternative understanding is illustrated in Figure 2. 
                                                                                                                                                             
“median voter” from the capture of open political processes by particularistic minorities (Moravcsik 2002, p. 606; 
see also pp. 613ff., esp. p. 614), an approach which is consistent with the arguments of this paper. See also 
Moravcsik 2000.  
60On the changing role of political parties, legislatures and executives over time, see, for example, Maier 1981; 
Taylor 2000. 
61Decree-laws in France, statutory instruments in Britain, and similar executive instruments elsewhere. 26 
This is not just a rejection of the hypothesis that the EU has “strengthened the state” but 
the suggestion of its opposite: that a strong national state has been necessary for the building of 
the EU: European openness is built on the prior closure of national politics in Europe. The Euro-
pean Union would therefore be not so much an institution which creates “fast track” style ar-
rangements for trade liberalization in Europe, but rather one which relies on widespread exoge-
nous developments in “fast track” democracy – decision-making with closed agenda-setting and 
information asymmetries, particularly in the issue areas which European integration touches on 
most importantly – at the national level. On this argument, it would be the national level of poli-
tics – rather than the EU level – which would the better subject of criticism on abstract grounds 
of openness and accountability, but paradoxically the EU level would require that type of na-
tional politics in order for the Union to function successfully.
62 
Finally, this approach – of measuring effects of international cooperation on domestic 
politics or democracy at the margin, with specific reference to the details of normal decision-
making arrangements of the participating states – may have a broader methodological value in 
contemporary debates on international cooperation and democracy. If questions of cooperation 
and democracy are considered only in the abstract, as problems facing anonymous “democratic 
states” and unspecified “international organizations,” certain tensions and opportunities can cer-
tainly be clarified and exposed. But on the other hand, it is quite possible that the particular de-
tails of the international cooperation on the one hand, and the pre-existing structure of domestic 
political organization on the other, might in any particular case give a different perspective. To 
take one example only, Keohane and Nye argue lucidly in “The club model of multilateral coop-
                                                 
62For a somewhat similar argument about a very different subject, see Mathieu Deflem’s (Deflem, 2000) argument 
about the historical foundations of international police cooperation (the forerunner of today’s Interpol): “The for-
mation of international police organizations was historically made possible when public police institutions were suf-
ficiently detached from the political centers of their respective states to function autonomously as expert bureaucra-
cies”  (p. 1).  27 
eration and problems of democratic legitimacy” that international cooperation is not transparent; 
that outsiders (both the rest of the government, and the general public) are excluded; and, most 
seriously, that “the lack of mediating politicians” is the most serious ‘democratic deficit’ of in-
ternational organizations.”
63 All these points are very well made. But in many countries, not least 
in Europe, and in some issue areas, such as economic regulation, national policy-making might 
already be based on opaque procedures; on arrangements which exclude outsiders and the public; 
and the mediating role of elected politicians might already be exiguous. Call it the ‘club model of 
national policy-making’, and it might be a fair description of regulatory policy-making arrange-
ments in the French Fifth Republic, and indeed elsewhere. The change required by the ‘club 
model’ of international cooperation of such a national political system would be quite different 
from the effects on a more open and contestable domestic politics. Questions of international co-
operation and democracy therefore benefit from consideration not only against abstract democ-
ratic theory, but also in light of the effect at the margin and the interaction with the existing na-
tional democratic arrangements of the participating states. 
This paper, which accepts Moravcsik’s approach to considering the interaction of inter-
national and domestic politics but (largely) rejects his conclusions as they apply to Europe, aims 
not to end the discussion of the connection between European integration and democracy, but to 
advance it. Serious consideration of the hypothesis suggested above – that the strong national 
state has built the European Union – would require extensive investigation and testing against al-
ternative hypotheses. Further research on the connection between international cooperation and 
executive resources in the European Union and beyond is the best way to address this question. 
                                                 
63Keohane and Nye, 2001, p. 23.  28 
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Figure One: The Strong State as Consequence of European Integration. 
   “Strengthen  the  State”. 
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Figure Two: European integration as consequence of the Strong State.  
   “Strong  State  as  Prequel”. 
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